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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the effects of compensation on the quality of internal control and provide the first 
evidence relating the time horizon of ex ante performance-based compensation incentives and 
internal control quality over financial reporting in the SOX 404 era. Specifically, we find that for 
CEOs and CFOs, the sensitivity of the option portfolio to stock price changes and the proportion 
of compensation received from long-term incentive plans are related to the propensity to report 
internal control weaknesses during the period 2004-2006. These effects are negative for long-term 
incentives but positive or insignificant for short-term incentives for both CEOs and CFOs, who 
have the primary responsibility for the financial reporting process. Compensation sensitivity is 
also more strongly related to more severe company-level than account-specific control 
weaknesses. This company-level weakness relation is stronger for the CFO, who has the primary 
responsibility for the processes generating financial information and for the financial reporting by 
the firm. Our findings indicate that SOX disclosures harness the power of compensation schemes 
to improve internal control quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hile performance-based executive compensation has become one of the primary tools for aligning 
owner and managerial interests (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), a significant body of research has found 
that managerial incentives from compensation are positively associated with subsequent 
manipulation of earnings for chief executive officers (CEOs) (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 
2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Cornett et al., 2008) and chief financial officers (CFOs) (Feng 
et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2010). The incentive to manipulate earnings arises from the limited downside risk 
associated with detection of the manipulation, creating convexity in CEO and CFO wealth relative to compensation 
scheme sensitivity (Burns and Kedia, 2006). In response to several high-profile accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX hereafter) was enacted to reduce the ability of managers to manipulate financial reporting.  
 
Notwithstanding the effect of performance-based incentives on earnings manipulation, research has not yet 
explored the impact of these incentives on the level of internal control implemented by management in the SOX era. 
If an impact does exist, it may be moderated by the time horizon of the incentives (Burns and Kedia, 2006) or the 
severity of weaknesses reported (Doyle et al., 2007b). CEOs and CFOs are of particular interest because they are 
specifically identified by SOX and may respond differently to performance-based incentives (Jiang et al., 2010). 
This gives rise to three central questions. Does performance-based compensation scheme sensitivity enhance or 
diminish internal control quality? Does the impact of sensitivity vary between short- and long-term time horizon 
incentives, or with the severity of the weaknesses reported i.e., company-level or account-specific weakness? 
Finally, is this relation different between CEOs and CFOs because of their different roles? 
 
W 
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In this paper, we consider two opposing forces describing the effect of compensation sensitivity on internal 
control over financial reporting in the SOX Section 404 era. 1. Higher-sensitivity compensation schemes increase 
the incentive to manipulate earnings in order to benefit in the short-term from higher stock prices; this reduces 
managers’ incentives to maintain effective systems of internal control (a positive relation between compensation 
sensitivity and the likelihood of reporting any material weaknesses in internal control (hereafter, ICW). 2. Higher-
sensitivity compensation schemes increase the incentive to minimize occurrences of ICW to avoid their disclosure 
and the related reduction in executive wealth (a negative relation). Potential wealth effects include personal fines 
and criminal penalties,
1
 declines in stock price (and compensation based on it) (Zhang, 2007), bonus clawbacks 
(Carter et al., 2009; Hoitash et al., 2012), and dismissal or related labor market penalties for senior executives 
(Collins et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010).  
 
Given that, we hypothesize that the net effect of these two forces is to better align the interests of managers 
and shareholders with respect to enhancing internal control, implying a negative association between compensation 
sensitivity and the reporting of ICW. We expect the effect of incentives to vary with their time horizon, so that long-
term incentives reduce the likelihood of reporting control weaknesses, and short-term incentives have no net effect. 
Long-term incentives to be received in the future have a lower present value than an equal amount of short-term 
incentives due to uncertainty related to their realization and the time value of money. This effect is expected to be 
more salient for company-level control weaknesses because of the critical roles that ‘tone at the top’ plays in such 
weaknesses, in contrast to account-specific weaknesses, which are more likely to arise from functionally specific, 
localized transaction processes.  
 
We investigate these relations using a sample of 302 firms (267 for CFOs) that disclose ICWs from 2004 
through 2006 relative to a control sample of 3,352 firms (2,918 for CFOs) that do not make any such disclosure.
2
 
Sensitivity is defined as the change in value of total compensation resulting from a one percent change in firm stock 
price (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Core and Guay, 2002; Feng et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2010). The components 
examined include stock options, restricted and unrestricted equity holdings, long term incentive plan payouts, and 
the sensitivity of salary and bonus incentives to changes in net income. To examine the potential effect of incentive 
time horizon, we distinguish between vested and unvested options and categorize each type of compensation as 
short- or long-term.  
 
The results indicate that the level and time horizon of CEO and CFO contingent compensation, in particular 
long-term incentives including unvested options and long-term incentive plan payouts, significantly reduce the 
likelihood of a firm reporting one or more ICWs. Unrestricted equity holdings, which were classified as having a 
short-term time horizon compensation, were also found to be negatively related to ICWs, but only for CFOs. Our 
findings contribute to the literature by providing the first evidence concerning how SOX enhances earnings quality, 
beyond imposition of fines and imprisonment: it harnesses the power of long-term compensation to enhance internal 
control over financial reporting.  
 
The disaggregation of ICWs by severity level confirms that compensation sensitivity is more strongly 
negatively related to company-level weaknesses than account-specific weaknesses, particularly for CFOs. Option-
based sensitivity driven by unvested options is predictive of company-level but not account-specific weaknesses for 
both CEOs and CFOs. CFO compensation sensitivity arising from restricted and unrestricted equity holdings and 
long term incentive plan payments are also significant. This finding contributes to research indicating that the two 
types of weaknesses are associated with different causal variables in the SOX 404 era (Doyle et al., 2007a). 
                                                 
1
 Section 304 requires that CEOs and CFOs reimburse bonuses and/or incentives/equity-based compensation received and any 
profit realized from the sales of securities of the issuer in the 12 months following an accounting restatement. Section 906 further 
specifies fines of up to $5 million and/or 20 years of incarceration for CEOs and CFOs who certify a control report they know to 
be inaccurate. 
2 Section 404 became effective for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004 for the largest firms (accelerated filers). 
Accelerated foreign private issuers (foreign firms not having a majority of their shares held and assets located in the US) have 
been required to comply with these requirements for fiscal years after July 15, 2007. Non- accelerated filers (public float less than 
$75 million) are required to provide a management report on internal control for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 
2007, and an auditor’s attestation on internal control for fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2010. Section 302 preceded 
Section 404 and applies to all SEC registrants effective August 29, 2002. 
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Overall, the findings suggest that firms may enhance internal control by emphasizing long-term contingent 
compensation for both CEOs and CFOs. CEO and CFO effects are consistent for all forms of compensation except 
unrestricted equity holdings, which reduce the likelihood of reporting weaknesses for CFOs, but not for CEOs. This 
negative relation parallels the findings of Jiang et al. (2010) for post-SOX discretionary accruals. This indicates that 
the incentives of both executives have a role to play in internal control effectiveness, in contrast to the dominance of 
CEO sensitivity found by Feng et al. (2011). This implication may be of practical interest to regulators, investors, 
and other financial statement users evaluating the quality of financial reporting at firms with high levels of 
performance-based compensation. Furthermore, the findings are relevant to board members attempting to address 
internal control in the design of compensation schemes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Managers contemplating the intentional manipulation of earnings in order to meet performance targets must 
weigh the incentive to manipulate for achieving the target against the penalty associated with the discovery and 
disclosure of manipulation (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Sen, 2007). Without mechanisms for discovering, 
disclosing and penalizing manipulation, earnings are more likely to be over- or under-reported by self-interested 
managers. Figure 1 depicts extant research investigating the relation between compensation scheme structure 
(sensitivity) and other firm characteristics, including internal control, manipulation of accounting figures, related 
penalties and benefits.  
 
Compensation Sensitivity and Earnings Manipulation 
 
Consistent with popular media reports of several high-profile accounting scandals including Enron, 
WorldCom and Global Crossing, a significant body of research has found a positive effect of performance-based 
compensation sensitivity on subsequent earnings manipulation after controlling for other firm characteristics (Figure 
1 paths (i) and (ii)). These studies have examined both manipulations that are allowable under generally accepted 
accounting principles and those that are not; they examine both pre-SOX accrual manipulations and accounting 
restatements (i.e., prior to August 2002) (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and 
Kedia, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Cornett et al., 2008; Efendi et al., 2007; Erickson et al., 2006; Feng et al., 
2011; Goldman and Slezak, 2006; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Johnson et al., 2009; McVay et al., 2006; O’Connor 
et al., 2006), and post-SOX accrual manipulations (Cohen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Larcker et al., 2007; 
Veenman et al., 2011). All studies find positive correlations except Jiang et al. (2010), which finds a negative 
relation between CFO compensation and forward-looking discretionary accruals in the post-SOX era and Erickson 
et al. (2006) who find no relation in the pre-SOX era. This positive relationship is consistent with findings in the 
compensation literature that find compensation sensitivity is positively related to risk-taking (e.g., Belkhir and 
Chazi, 2010). 
 
Compensation
Sensitivity
Short-term
Long-term
Internal Control
Weaknesses
Company-level
Account-specific
Earnings
Manipulation
(i) +
Penalties
(iii) +
(v) + (iv) +
Benefits
(vi) +
Other Firm 
Characteristics
Size, Age, Financial 
strength, Structure, 
Stability of Size, 
Governance, Size of 
Auditor, Ownership
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(vii) +
H1, H2
 
 
Arrows (i) – (vii) depict prior research streams and relation sign 
Figure 1. Research Model in relation to Prior Research Investigating Firm Characteristics,  
Compensation Sensitivity, Internal Control, Earnings Manipulation and Penalties 
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Earnings Manipulation, Benefits and Penalties 
 
Both the positive and negative outcomes arising from earnings manipulations have been examined in 
empirical research. To the extent that managers foresee them, these outcomes act as incentives. Burns and Kedia 
(2008) find strong evidence of significant ex post benefits arising from manipulation (Figure 1 path (iii)): executives 
at firms engaging in deliberate earnings manipulations exercise 60% more options than their counterparts at other 
firms. This occurs despite the significant penalties to executives when manipulation is detected and disclosed 
(Figure 1 path (iv)). Restatements lead to a significant decrease in share value both pre-SOX (Palmrose et al., 2004) 
and to a lesser extent, post-SOX (Burks, 2011; Hranaiova and Byers, 2007), directly reducing the value of equity-
based incentives. Beyond these immediate effects, executives (Burks, 2010; Cheng and Farber, 2008; Collins et al., 
2009; Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010) and directors (Srinivasan, 2005) of firms disclosing 
accounting errors are much more likely to leave the firm. CFOs leaving the firm are subject to stiff labor-market 
penalties (Collins et al., 2009), while those remaining with the firm are subject to significant reductions in bonus 
payments (Burks, 2010; Hoitash et al., 2012). The positive relation found between sensitivity and earnings 
manipulation (path (i)) indicates that executives place a higher expected value on the compensation-based benefits 
of manipulation (path (iii)) than on the compensation-based penalties associated with the manipulation being 
discovered and disclosed (path (iv)). This expected value is the sum of the products of the likelihood of the 
benefits/penalties and their magnitude.  
 
Internal Control Weaknesses, Earnings Manipulation and Penalties 
 
SOX attempts to mitigate managers’ ability to manipulate financial reporting by requiring both 
management and auditors to evaluate and report on the quality of internal control.
3
 Subsequent research has 
confirmed the relevance of SOX’s focus on internal control, finding a positive relation between the existence of 
ICWs and subsequent accounting manipulations (Figure 1 path (v)). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008, 2009) and Doyle 
et al. (2007b) find that firms reporting ICWs have a greater absolute value of discretionary accruals, however 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) pool Sections 302 and 404 ICWs and find no evidence of a relation to signed 
accruals. They interpret this to indicate that ICWs give rise to unintentional errors rather than income-increasing 
manipulations. Ghosh et al. (2010) compare the overall level of manipulation in the pre- and post-SOX eras and find 
a significant decline.  
 
There are significant penalties to executives for weaknesses in internal control beyond those imposed by 
the SOX legislation. Reporting ICWs also leads to lower share prices (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Beneish et al., 
2008; De Franco et al., 2005; Hammersley et al., 2008; Ogneva et al., 2007) and as a result, reduced managerial 
equity-related wealth (path (vi)). ICW may weaken the ability of accounting systems to monitor operations, resulting 
in day-to-day operational difficulties, and thus lower earnings (Feng et al., 2009). In addition, studies of accounting 
accrual manipulations comparing the pre- and post-SOX eras (Cohen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010) find a reduction 
but not elimination of earnings manipulation arising from compensation sensitivity, indicating that SOX-related 
penalties have affected managerial behavior. It also creates significant penalties for the CEOs and CFOs of firms 
that do not comply (Carter et al., 2009), especially for CFOs, who face significant labor market penalties (Collins et 
al., 2009). Brown and Lim (2012) also find a decreased strength in the association between earnings and executives’ 
(CEO and CFO) compensation when the firm reports ICW. In extreme cases, executives face criminal penalties in 
addition to stiff fines and compensation clawbacks. Carter et al. (2009) report an increase in the weight placed on 
earnings changes as a determinant of executive compensation, and a decrease in the proportion of compensation 
from salary after SOX, that is larger for CEOs and CFOs than for other executives. In addition, Hoitash et al. (2012) 
find that disclosure of ICW leads to reductions in CFO total compensation, bonus compensation, and equity 
compensation, revealing the importance of internal control quality as a non-financial performance measure in the 
evaluation of CFOs. 
                                                 
3
 Section 302 requires that management establish, maintain and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls. They 
must report the results of this evaluation and any significant changes in internal controls in both quarterly and annual financial 
statements. In doing so, managers must report any specific internal control weaknesses that exist. Section 404 requires that 
auditors independently report on internal control and describe ICW. Section 304 specifies substantial penalties for misreporting, 
including large fines and imprisonment. 
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Weaknesses are also associated with audit delays (Ettredge et al. 2006) and higher audit fees (Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2008; Hoitash et al., 2009; Raghunandan and Rama, 2006), further lowering earnings. Boards of directors 
are able to initiate an investigation of weaknesses to detect compensation targets being met via manipulation, 
leading to adjustment of compensation in current and future years to offset these effects (Burks, 2010; Hoitash et al., 
2012). Further, given SOX's requirements and responsibilities for audit committees (Srinivasan, 2005) the board 
may go beyond merely offsetting the manipulation for the purpose of calculating compensation and further penalize 
the manager, including termination of employment (Burks, 2010; Cheng and Farber, 2008; Collins et al., 2009; 
Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008; Johnstone et al., 2011; Li et al., 2010).  
 
Other Firm Characteristics and Internal Control Weaknesses 
 
A substantial body of research examines the firm and auditor characteristics associated with the 
effectiveness of internal control (Figure 1 path (vii)). Ge and McVay (2005) find several factors to be significant, 
including whether or not the firm is profitable, business complexity, and audit firm size. Krishnan (2005) finds that 
audit committee independence and financial expertise enhance internal control. Bronson et al. (2006) find that firm 
size, sales growth and institutional ownership are associated with internal control effectiveness. Doyle et al. (2007a) 
examine a larger sample and find new factors to be significant including firm age, bankruptcy risk, and 
restructuring. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) expand the analysis to focus on auditor incentives and confirm that 
audit firm size, institutional ownership and earnings restatements are associated with the likelihood of reporting 
ICWs. Zhang et al. (2007) find audit committee financial expertise and auditor independence reduce the likelihood 
of control weaknesses. Hoitash et al. (2009) find that board strength and audit committee experience in accounting 
and supervision reduce the likelihood of reporting weaknesses.  
 
Compensation Sensitivity and Quality of Internal Control 
 
In contrast to the extensive research stream investigating the effect of compensation on earnings 
manipulation, and notwithstanding both the centrality of performance-based ex ante incentives in explaining 
managerial behavior, and SOX’s focus on enhancing internal control to mitigate manipulation, research has not yet 
investigated whether compensation incentives affect the quality of internal control over financial reporting.  
 
Previous research described above finds a positive relation between compensation sensitivity and 
subsequent earnings manipulation (Figure 1 path (i)), indicating that managers place a higher expected value on the 
anticipated benefits of manipulation (path (iii)) than on the possible future penalties arising from potential detection 
(path (iv). Compensation sensitivity creates incentives to manipulate which may enable managers to tolerate internal 
control weaknesses in order to maintain the ability to manipulate future earnings. Given that there is a positive 
relation between control weaknesses and manipulation (path (v)), and absent incremental penalties to internal 
control weaknesses (i.e. path (vi) = 0), one would expect a positive relation between compensation sensitivity and 
the likelihood of ICWs. 
 
However, evidence exists showing significant penalties for reporting ICWs (i.e. path (vi) is positive). ICWs 
are reported concurrently with audited financial statements, leading to reactions by markets and boards of directors. 
Research has found that firms reporting weaknesses have higher market costs of equity, reducing their equity 
valuation (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Beneish et al., 2008; Hammersley et al., 2008), and may incur operational 
costs due to a lack of control (Feng et al., 2009). The expected net effect of the penalties of immediate reporting of 
ICWs relative to the benefits of manipulation is unclear. Balsam and Jiang (2009) make no prediction of the net 
impact of these two opposing effects, but find a negative relation between the aggregate sensitivity of top five 
executives’ stock and stock option holdings and ICW reporting.4 Consistent with this finding, in the next section we 
hypothesize that the expected value of penalties for reporting ICWs dominate the anticipated benefits of earnings 
manipulation, but that the net effect of these incentives depends upon whether their time horizon is short-term or 
long-term.  
 
                                                 
4
 In a robustness test they aggregate CEO and CFO compensation and find similar results. 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Compensation sensitivity time horizon and quality of internal control  
 
The time horizon of performance-based compensation is expected to be salient in explaining the reporting 
of SOX- related ICWs. Only three studies examining compensation sensitivity’s effect on earnings manipulations 
(Figure 1 path (i)) address incentive time horizon. Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that the time horizon of an 
incentive significantly affects its future behavioral effect. We classify each form of compensation as having either a 
short- or long-term time horizon. In the empirical analysis each form of compensation is examined individually so 
that the results are not an artifact of this classification, and because the different scales of the forms make 
aggregation problematic.
5
  
 
Vested options can be exercised at any time, making executive wealth a convex function of stock price. 
This means that an income-increasing manipulation for an option that is at or close to being ‘in the money’ increases 
wealth more than a similar income-decreasing manipulation decreases wealth. This creates an incentive for income-
increasing accounting manipulation that is greater than for unrestricted equity holdings. Similar convexity in salary 
and bonus payments that are received immediately would have similar effects. Unrestricted equity holdings can be 
sold immediately and are classified as short-term time horizon holdings. In contrast, unvested options, restricted 
equity holdings and long term incentive plans are subject to a waiting period with associated uncertainty concerning 
price or performance declines or downward adjustment by the board of directors after the reporting of any related 
ICW (Figure 1 path (vi)), therefore, rational managers discount their value.  
 
Managers weigh the expected value of benefits accruing from the weakness (the likelihood the weakness 
can be exploited to manipulate earnings times the incremental compensation that would be earned from it) against 
the expected value of costs of a control weakness (the penalties for public reporting times its probability of 
detection). While the benefits vary with the time frame of compensation, the penalties do not. For short-term horizon 
incentives, the net effect is unclear. For long-term horizon incentives the same probability and costs of reporting an 
ICW exist but are weighed against the future value of incentives from later, more uncertain unvested incentives 
(Figure 1 path (vi)). Based on this, a negative relation is hypothesized between incentives and ICW reporting.  
 
H1.  Long term horizon pay-for-performance incentives (unvested options, restricted equity holdings and long 
term incentive plans) are negatively related to the likelihood of reporting a material ICW.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2):  Compensation sensitivity and severity of internal control weaknesses 
 
Following a classification scheme proposed by Moody’s, Doyle et al. (2007a, 2007b) subdivide ICWs by 
their severity based on their scope of impact. This scheme distinguishes company-level weaknesses (CLWs - which 
have a pervasive impact and call into question management's ability to prepare financial statements and control the 
business) from account-specific weaknesses (ASWs - which have a narrow scope and are susceptible to in-depth 
investigation by auditors, the board of directors or regulators). CLWs include conditions such as an ineffective 
control environment, an ineffective audit committee, an inadequate internal audit or risk assessment function, and an 
ineffective financial reporting process (PCAOB Standard No. 2).
6
 ASWs relate to control problems over 
transactional-level processes or specific account balance, such as inventory, accounts receivable, and legal 
proceedings (Doss, 2004). None of the empirical studies relating the reporting of weaknesses to stock market values, 
bonuses, turnover or subsequent labor market costs (Figure 1 path (vi)) compare the effects of CLWs and ASWs. 
 
CLWs are more likely to reflect CEO and CFO behavior since the CEO and CFO set the ‘tone at the top’, 
an integral part of the overall control environment. The greater scope of these ICW would better facilitate 
managerial manipulation (Figure 1 path (v)), making it more likely to reflect the effect of compensation sensitivity. 
                                                 
5
 For example, the effect of restricted equity options is calculated based on the effect of a 1% change in equity price, while 
ltip_ratio is long-term incentive payouts divided by total compensation grants. Aggregating these into a single long-term 
incentive measure requires development of a non-arbitrary weighting scheme. 
6
 According to PCAOB Standard No.2, company-level controls refer to controls that “might have a pervasive effect on the 
achievement of many overall objectives of the control criteria,” whereas specific controls are those that are “designed to achieve 
specific objectives of the control criteria.” 
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ASWs are more likely to reflect local business processes, limiting the ability to manipulate and therefore their 
relation to compensation sensitivity. Offsetting their higher impact, the greater severity of a CLW would make it 
more susceptible to significant penalties levied by the board of directors and regulators described in the discussion 
of Figure 1 path (vi). The net effect is unclear. Brown and Lim (2012) examine compensation penalties and find that 
reporting a CLW offsets any potential positive effect from ROA improvements in addition to a fixed reduction in 
cash compensation, while ASWs are not associated with elimination of ROA improvement effects on cash 
compensation. Doyle et al. (2007b) find that CLWs are positively related to accrual manipulation but ASWs are not. 
Balsam and Jiang (2009) find the effect of CEO and CFO aggregate compensation sensitivity is more salient for 
company-level than for ASWs. Overall, the effects hypothesized in H1 are expected to be most salient for CLWs. 
 
H2.  The negative relation between long-term compensation sensitivity and reported ICWs will be stronger for 
company-level control weaknesses than account-specific weaknesses. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODS 
 
Sample Selection 
 
Table 1A summarizes the sample selection process. Executive compensation and management ownership 
data were obtained for 1,861 firms from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp for the 2004–2006 period. For year-ends 
after June 15, 2006, ExecuComp significantly revised its reporting of long-term incentive payouts to reflect the new 
compensation reporting requirements SFAS 123(R), precluding comparison to the 2004–2006 period. One hundred 
and fifty-eight firms with missing control variable data from Compustat were eliminated. Corporate governance data 
were then manually collected from Forms 10-K, 8-K, and DEF 14A filed in the sample period, and 18 firms with 
missing governance data were deleted, yielding a final sample of 1,685 firms. Next, firms with ICW were identified 
using the Audit Analytics database. Each observation was validated using manually collected SOX 404 auditors’ 
opinions containing references to ICWs in financial reporting in firms’ 10-K, 8-K, and 10-Q filings from January 
2004 to December 2006. Depending on the firm’s fiscal year-end, its first SOX 404 opinion can fall in either fiscal 
year 2004 or 2005.
7
 The intersection of the data from ExecuComp, Compustat and Audit Analytics with manual 
validation created a data set of 302 distinct firms for CEOs (140 firms in 2004; 115 firms in 2005; and 47 firms in 
2006) and 267 firms for CFOs (124 firms in 2004; 99 firms in 2005; and 44 firms in 2006) with ICW. In the event of 
more than one disclosure by a firm during the sample period, we retain only the first disclosure. Our control sample 
consists of 1,383 firms for CEOs (3,352 firm-year observations) and 1,325 firms for CFOs (2,918 firm-year 
observations) that did not report ICW during the sample period. The final sample contains 3,654 firm-year 
observations for CEOs and 3,185 firm-year observations for CFOs.  
 
Industry Distribution of Sample 
 
Table 1B reports the industry distribution of the CEO compensation sample of 302 firms with ICW and the 
1,388 control firms based on the Fama-French five-industry classification. The high-technology sector constitutes 25 
percent of the firms with ICW, followed by the consumer service sector (23%), manufacturing (20%), health care 
(5%), and other industries (27%). The industry distribution is similar for the control firms. 
                                                 
7
 Since SOX404 was effective for accelerated filer firms (market capitalization greater than $75 million) in fiscal years ending or 
after November 15, 2004, an accelerated-filer with a fiscal year ending on or after November 15, 2004 filed its auditor’s first 
SOX 404 opinion in its 2004 fiscal year, while a firm with a fiscal year ending from June 1 through November 14, 2004 was not 
required to file its first SOX404 audit opinion until its 2005 fiscal year. For firms with fiscal year-ends of January-May, the 
Compustat data filed “YEARA” value does not align with firms’ fiscal year-ends. Therefore, we carefully control and align 
firms’ SOX 404 reports with the respective Compustat in 2004-2006. 
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Table 1A 
Sample Selection – SOX 404 Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses (ICWs) 
Number of firms in ExecuComp with complete compensation data for 2004-2006 1,861 
Less: Firms missing Compustat data (158) 
Number of firms with ExecuComp and Compustat data for 2004-2006 1,703 
Less: Firms missing governance data (18) 
Number of firms with Execomp, Compustat and governance data 1,685 
 
Weakness Sample (ICW = 1) 
Number of distinct firms that disclosed material weakness(es) in internal control from November 13, 2004 to December 31, 2006  
(one observation per firm) 
 CEO CFO 
2004 140 124 
2005 115 99 
2006 47 44 
Total sample 302 267 
 
Control Sample (ICW = 0) 
Number of distinct firms that did not report material weakness(es) in internal control during the period November 13, 2004 to December 
31, 2006 
 CEO CFO 
Firms 1,383 1,325 
Firm-observations 3,352 2,918 
 
Table 1B 
Distribution of Firms by Industry for CEO sample 
 ICW = 1  NOMW 
Industry N %  N % 
Consumer products and services 70 23  269 20 
Manufacturing 61 20  350 25 
High-tech 76 25  275 20 
Health care  15 5  111 8 
Others 80 27  378 27 
Total 302   1,383  
 
ICW = 1 if one or more material weaknesses in internal control reported between November 13, 2004 and December 31, 
2006; else 0 (NOMW). 
Based on Fama/French 5 industry benchmark portfolios. 
 
Research Design 
 
The hypothesized (H1) relation between the sensitivity of the CEO’s performance-based compensation 
structure (e.g. aggregate stock options, restricted and unrestricted equity, long-term incentive payouts, and salary 
plus bonus) and the propensity to disclose ICW is estimated to be the following baseline logistic regression:  
 
ICWit =  0 + 1 delta_optionsit + 2 delta_restrit + 3 delta_equityit + 4 ltip_ratioit + 5 delta_salaryit + 6  
 opt_exer_ratioit + 7 sizeit + 8 age + 9 riskit + 10 mtbit+ 11 lossit + 12 levit + 13 exsaleit + 14 segit + 15  
 restructit + 16 fortransit+ 17 big4it + 18 afeesit + 19 audchit + 20 ceochairit + 21 bdindit + 22 consumit+ 23  
 manufit+ 24 hitechit+ 25 healthit + 26 soxyr2it+ 27 soxyr3it + it (1) 
 
where variables are defined below, and i indicates the firm and t indicates the year. Firms reporting one or more 
ICW are only included in the analysis for the first year they report. Firms never reporting an ICW during the sample 
period (the control sample) are included for all years available. The observations are pooled. 
 
An alternative version of Equation (1) that disaggregates stock options by time horizon (replacing 
delta_options with delta_vested and delta_unvested) is also tested: 
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ICWit =  0 + 1delta_vestedit + 2 delta_unvestedit + 3 delta_restrit + 4 delta_equityit + 5 ltip_ratioit + 6  
 delta_salaryit + 7 opt_exer_ratioit + 8 sizeit + 9 age + 10 riskit + 11 mtbit+ 12 lossit + 13 levit + 14 exsaleit  
 + 15 segit + 16 restructit + 17 fortransit+ 18 big4it + 19 afeesit + 20 audchit + 21 ceochairit + 22 bdindit +  
 23 consumit+ 24 manufit+ 25 hitechit+ 26 healthit + 27 soxyr2it+ 28 soxyr3it + it (2) 
 
The hypothesized relation (H2) between the sensitivity of the CEO’s performance-based compensation 
structure and the propensity to disclose company-level (vs. account-specific) ICW in financial reporting is estimated 
by classifying control weakness observations as either (1) company-level material weaknesses, or (2) account-
specific material weaknesses (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007a; Doyle et al., 2007 a, 2007b) and by running the 
baseline and disaggregated models separately pooled with control firm observations.  
 
All significance levels in the logistic regression analysis are estimated using bootstrapped bias-corrected 
and accelerated coefficients from logistic regressions (e.g., Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) as follows. A ‘resample’ of 
the original sample size was selected from the sample with replacement of observations. For the resample, 
regression coefficients for the model were estimated. This was repeated 2,000 times to generate a distribution for 
each coefficient. Efron and Tibshirani (1997), Gong (1986), and Steyerberg et al. (2001) demonstrate that 
bootstrapping methods substantially reduce the variability of error rate estimates in logistic regression because of 
their full use of sample information.  
 
Because firms without ICW are included in multiple years, we must account for potential serial correlation 
when estimating Equations (1) and (2). Goncalves and White (2005) show that bootstrapped estimates are accurate 
in the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the regression setting. In untabulated analysis we adjust 
standard errors for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Froot, 1989), resulting in more conservative standard 
error estimates and find similar results.  
 
Measures of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity  
 
We follow the approach of Burns and Kedia (2006) to measure the sensitivity of the various components of 
compensation. To control for potential outliers, the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. First, option 
sensitivity is measured using delta_vested and delta_unvested, which are measured as the change in the Black-
Scholes option value (in $000s) of the vested and unvested portions, respectively, of a CEO's stock option portfolio 
for a one percentage point change in stock price. This is calculated using the approach of Core and Guay (2002). 
These are summed to obtain total option sensitivity (delta_options). Second, the sensitivities of restricted 
(delta_restr) and unrestricted (delta_equity) equity holdings are defined as the change in the value of these holdings 
for a one percentage point change in stock price. They are obtained by multiplying the number of shares held by 1% 
of the stock price and expressed in $000’s. Third, as in Burns and Kedia (2006), the incentive provided by long-term 
incentive plans (ltip_ratio) is measured as the long-term incentive plan payouts divided by the total compensation, 
including current year option grants. These are typically based on performance over a three-to-five year period. 
 
Fourth, sensitivity of salary and bonus (delta_salary) is calculated as the ratio of the annual percentage 
change in salary and bonus to the percentage change in firm net income. This approach provides a different 
sensitivity measure for each firm for every year and is different from that used in Burns and Kedia (2006), which is 
common to all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry. Fifth, the ratio of options exercised in the current year to 
vested options as of year-end (opt_exer_ratio) is included to measure the extent to which managers have already 
realized profits from option exercises.  
 
Control Variables 
 
The analysis controls for four types of firm factors found to be associated with ICWs in financial reporting: 
(1) Financial and stability characteristics, such as firm size (size), age (age), bankruptcy risk (risk), market-to-book 
(mtb), loss (loss), leverage (lev), and extreme sales growth (exsale) (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Beneish et al., 
2008; Doyle et al., 2007a; Klein, 2002;); (2) business complexity, such as number of segments (seg), restructuring 
(restruct), and foreign transactions (fortrans) (Ashbaug-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a); (3) audit quality, 
such as big-4 auditors (big4), audit fees (afees), and auditor changes (audch) (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et 
al., 2007a; Klein, 2002; Krishnan, 2005); (4) Two governance variables are included. Ceochair controls for the 
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effect of a CEO serving as the chairman of the board of directors because prior studies provide evidence that CEOs 
who also serve as chair have a negative impact on board monitoring (Alexander et al., 1993; Dechow et al., 1996). 
Board independence (bdind) is included because more independent boards reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud 
(Beasley, 1996) and similarly monitor for ICWs. Industry effects are controlled using Fama and French’s five-
industry classification effects, and year effects are captured using indicator variables for each of the two years after 
the initial year of mandatory SOX reporting. The definitions for all variables are listed below each table. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 2A presents descriptive statistics for compensation sensitivity in the CEO and CFO compensation 
samples. For all the compensation components except salary, pay-for-performance sensitivities for CEOs are 
substantial and are higher than for CFOs. Table 2B conducts univariate analyses comparing the characteristics of 
firms reporting weaknesses (ICWs) to firms with effective controls (NOMW) for the two samples. Firms with 
weaknesses have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for all components of compensation. On average, the value 
of the stock options held by CEOs (CFOs) at firms with ICW changes by $219,000 ($41,870), for a 1% change in 
stock price composed of $161,820 ($25,320) from vested options and $57,660 ($16,550) from unvested options. 
These values are significantly lower than they would be for CEOs and CFOs at firms without weaknesses.  
 
Table 2A 
Sample Descriptive statistics 
 CEO (N=3,654)  CFO (N=3,185) 
 Mean Std.Dev Min. Max.  Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. 
delta_options 354.35 553.37 0.00 3391.18  75.69 114.66 0.00 797.08 
delta_vest 260.98 443.85 0.00 2835.29  50.33 86.02 0.00 553.30 
delta_unvest 94.75 178.19 0.00 1770.23  25.97 45.18 0.00 367.51 
delta_equity 557.99 1688.71 0.00 13319.71  29.83 57.22 0.00 475.99 
delta_salary 0.39 1.26 -0.33 11.79  0.45 1.68 -0.36 14.20 
opt_exer_ratio 0.20 0.33 0.00 1.00  0.20 0.34 0.00 1.00 
delta_restr 30.31 68.28 0.00 456.53  8.26 17.01 0.00 115.30 
ltip_ratio x 100 2.81 9.33 0.00 59.88  2.30 8.10 0.00 54.34 
size 16368.31 77604.35 20.63 1494037.00  13736.35 66070.09 20.63 1494037.00 
age 24.60 19.11 1.00 81.00  24.50 19.09 1.00 81.00 
risk 197.51 2777.07 -30.82 99642.76  184.96 2610.79 -30.82 99642.76 
mtb 1.98 1.28 0.65 15.65  1.98 1.30 0.65 15.65 
loss 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00  0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
lev 0.15 0.14 0.00 1.03  0.15 0.14 0.00 1.03 
exsale 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00  0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
seg 4.88 2.97 1.00 24.00  4.87 2.95 1.00 24.00 
restruct 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
fortrans 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00  0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
big4 0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00  0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00 
afees 3.79 5.88 0.09 90.20  3.61 5.34 0.092 90.20 
audch 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
ceochair 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00  0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
bdind 0.78 0.11 0.27 1.22  0.78 0.11 0.27 1.22 
consum 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00  0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
manuf 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00  0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
hitech 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00  0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
health 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00  0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
others 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00  0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
All compensation sensitivity measures winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
delta_options = change in the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price in $000s. 
delta_vest = vested delta options in $000s.. 
delta_unvest = unvested delta_options in $000s. 
delta_equity = change in the value of unrestricted equity for a 1% change in stock price in $000s. 
delta_salary = Percentage change in salary and bonus/percentage change in NI over previous year. 
opt_exer_ratio = Ratio of options exercised in current year/exercisable options as at year-end. 
delta_restr = change in the value of restricted equity for a 1% change in stock price in $000s. 
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ltip_ratio = Cumulative long-term incentive plan payouts/total compensation including grants. 
size = Total Assets at beginning of year in $millions. 
age = Number of years the firm has CRSP data. 
risk = Altman's Z-Score where Z-Score = 3.3*(operating income after depreciation/assets)+ 1.2*((current asset-current liability)/assets)+ 
(sales/assets)+0.6*((shares outstanding*price_fiscyr)/(total long term debt)) + 1.4*(retained earnings/assets) = if long-term debt >0, 
else Z-Score = 3.3*(operating income after depreciation/assets)+1.2*((current asset-current liability)/assets) + 
(sales/assets)+1.4*(retained earnings/assets) (negatively related to bankruptcy risk) 
mtb = (assets - book value of common equity+ market value of common equity)/assets at beginning of year. 
loss = 1 if earnings before extraordinary items in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
lev = Current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets. 
exsale = 1 if top quintile industry-adjusted sales growth over prior year, and 0 otherwise. 
seg = Number of business segments + geographic segments in year t. 
restruct = 1 if restructure charge is not equal to zero for any year in 2001-2003, and 0 otherwise. 
fortrans = 1 if firm has a non-zero foreign transaction in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
big4 = 1 if auditor is a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise. 
afees = Annual audit fees in $millions. 
audch = 1 if there is an auditor change in the previous or current year, and 0 otherwise. 
ceochair = 1 if the CEO also a chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. 
bdind = Proportion of board members who are independent. 
consum, manuf, hitech, health = 1 based on Fama/French 5 industry benchmark portfolios (baseline category others).  
 
Table 2B 
Comparison of Firms Reporting Internal Control Weaknesses with Other Firms 
 CEO  CFO 
 ICW NOMW t-statistic p-value  ICW NOMW t-statistic p-value 
delta_options 219.00 366.54 -5.56 ***  41.87 78.79 -7.76 *** 
delta_vest 161.82 269.91 -4.95 ***  25.32 52.61 -7.29 *** 
delta_unvest 57.66 98.10 -5.37 ***  16.55 26.83 -5.52 *** 
delta_equity  324.30 579.05 -3.88 ***  11.88 31.47 -11.49 *** 
delta_salary 0.25 0.40 -2.46 ***  0.40 0.46 -0.48  
opt_exer_ratio 0.15 0.20 -2.99 ***  0.14 0.21 -3.3 *** 
delta_restr 16.89 31.52 -4.75 ***  4.44 8.61 -5.41 *** 
ltip_ratio x 100 1.26 2.96 -4.35 ***  0.88 2.431 -4.80 *** 
size 11788.99 16780.88 1.30   7480.56 14308.76 2.77 ** 
age 21.55 24.87 3.13 ***  21.27 24.79 3.12 *** 
risk 43.34 211.40 -3.20 ***  33.38 198.83 -3.14 *** 
mtb 1.78 2.00 -3.26 ***  1.80 1.99 -2.67 *** 
loss 0.26 0.09 6.36 ***  0.28 0.10 6.46 *** 
lev 0.16 0.15 1.52   0.16 0.15 1.13  
exsale 0.23 0.20 1.26   0.24 0.20 1.56  
seg 5.44 4.83 2.85 ***  5.39 4.83 2.57 *** 
restruct 0.41 0.29 4.13 ***  0.42 0.29 3.98 *** 
fortrans 0.35 0.26 3.07 ***  0.36 0.26 3.16 *** 
big4 0.93 0.97 -2.41 **  0.93 0.96 -2.34 ** 
afees 4659.63 3710.20 -1.61   4284.89 3543.29 -1.34  
audch 0.03 0.04 -1.04   0.03 0.05 -1.16  
ceochair 0.48 0.55 -2.28 **  0.46 0.54 -2.52 *** 
bdind 0.76 0.78 -2.62 ***  0.77 0.78 -2.28 ** 
consum 0.23 0.18 2.05 **  0.24 0.17 2.36 ** 
manuf 0.20 0.27 -2.74 ***  0.19 0.28 -3.37 *** 
hitech 0.25 0.18 2.66 ***  0.25 0.19 2.39 ** 
health 0.05 0.08 -2.22 **  0.06 0.08 -1.76 * 
others 0.26 0.29 -0.90   0.26 0.28 -0.62  
N 302 3,352    267 2,918   
p-values are based on two-tailed tests: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
ICW = 1 if one or more material weaknesses in internal control reported between November 13,2004 and December 31, 2006; else 0 
(NOMW). 
 
The mean sensitivity of restricted equity for CEOs for firms with weaknesses is $16,890 and is significantly 
lower than the $31,520 for control firms. Similarly, long-term incentive plan payouts for CEOs at firms with ICW 
are lower than NOMW. CEO salary plus bonus sensitivity to change in net income for firms with weaknesses is 25 
percent lower than the 40 percent for CEOS at control firms, while it is 40 percent for CFOs at firms with 
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weaknesses and 46 percent for CFOs at control firms. The mean sensitivity of unrestricted equity holdings for CEOs 
(CFOs) at firms with ICW is $324,300 ($11,880), which is lower than the level at firms without weaknesses of 
$579,050 ($31,470). Finally, the proportion of options exercised during the year to those vested at year-end is 15 
percent (14 percent), lower than the mean of 20 percent (21 percent) at control firms. 
 
We also find that, when compared to firms with effective controls, firms with ICW are smaller, younger, 
have a higher risk, a lower market-to-book ratio, report higher losses, are more complex (as measured by having 
more segments, more restructuring and foreign transactions). In addition, firms with ICW are less likely to be clients 
of Big 4 auditors, report higher audit fees, and are less likely to have the CEO serving as the chairman of the board 
as well as being less likely to have independent board members. This is consistent with findings in prior research. 
 
The compensation components were analyzed for correlation. In general, the incentives of the equity and 
option components of compensation are significantly positively correlated, while the incentives provided by salary 
and bonus and long term incentive plan payouts are less correlated. None of the correlations for variables included 
simultaneously are above 0.56, and the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) in our regressions is 4.9, which is well 
below the suggested threshold of 10 (Gujarati, 1995; Marquandt, 1980). Our examination of the standard errors and 
size of the coefficients also shows that they are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the highly correlated 
variables, indicating multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). 
 
H1 Results:  CEO/CFO Compensation Sensitivity and Control Weaknesses 
 
Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis estimating the effect of sensitivity of several 
components of CEO/CFO compensation on the disclosure of at least one ICW. The models are effective with a 
significant model chi-square value (p<0.01). The pseudo R
2
 ranges from 0.18 to 0.20. The baseline aggregate 
options model from Equation (1) in models (1) and (3) indicates that option sensitivity is negative for CFOs 
(p<0.05) but not for CEOs. The results for the disaggregated options model from Equation (2) in models (2) and (4) 
indicate that unvested options are negatively related to control weaknesses but vested options are not, for both CEOs 
and CFOs. This confirms the appropriateness of disaggregating compensation by time horizon. The coefficient for 
long term incentive plan payouts sensitivity is also significantly negative for both CEOs and CFOs. Restricted stock 
holdings of CEOs are marginally negatively associated with weaknesses in model (1). 
 
None of the short-term incentives are significant for CEOs, but unrestricted equity sensitivity is negatively 
associated with ICW for CFOs. This suggests that CFOs may be affected by their equity holdings differently from 
CEOs. Table 2A indicates that mean CFO sensitivity to unrestricted equity holdings is only 5% of mean CEO 
unrestricted equity holdings (29.83/557.99). CFOs unrestricted equity sensitivity is only 40% of that for their 
options holdings, as compared to 157% for CEOs. This divergence between the two roles is much greater than the 
sensitivity of other forms of compensation. This may have implications for market signalling. CEOs and CFOs are 
generally expected to hold significant amounts of wealth in the form of their firm’s stock. Insider stock sales are 
interpreted as a signal of the firm’s future prospects; liquidation of a substantial proportion of their holdings can 
have a significant impact on stock price. No similar interpretation is associated with sales arising from stock option 
exercises. Given the CFO’s relatively low level of benefit from an equity sale relative to the information 
communicated to the market and the costs that this would lead to for their superior, the CEO, who has much larger 
holdings, they may choose to act in the interests of the CEO for job security and reputational reasons and not sell 
equity opportunistically (Feng et al., 2011). There is some prior empirical evidence that the effect of unrestricted 
equity holdings on earnings quality is consistent with long- rather than short-term horizon sensitivity. Burns and 
Kedia (2006) find vested options to be the only element of compensation structure associated with subsequent 
restatements, with other forms of compensation, including unrestricted equity, having insignificant effects. Cohen et 
al. (2008) examine abnormal accruals in the pre- and post-SOX eras.
8
 They find that vested options are unrelated to 
accrual manipulation, while unvested options and equity are positively related to accrual manipulation in both the 
pre- and post-SOX eras. This evidence suggests CFOs are motivated by their relatively small unrestricted equity 
holdings to act with a long-term holding horizon. 
                                                 
8 Cohen et al.’s (2008) measure of options is the proportion of the firm owned by the CEO and CFO, rather than the value arising 
from those options from a one percent change in firm value (Burns and Kedia, 2006) or the ratio of option value to salary 
compensation (Efendi et al., 2007). 
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Table 3 
CEO/CFO Performance-based Compensation and Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses (H1) 
 Time Horizon Expected Sign  CEO  CFO 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
delta_options ST/LT - -0.27     -3.28 **   
delta_vest ST none   0.05     -2.41  
delta_unvest LT -   -1.48 **    -5.43 * 
            
delta_equity  ST none -0.07  -0.07   -6.40 *** -6.51 *** 
delta_salary ST none -0.01  -0.01   0.02  0.02  
opt_exer_ratio ST none -0.28  -0.27   -0.25  -0.24  
delta_restr LT - -2.57 * -2.33   -7.88  -6.63  
ltip_ratio LT - -2.36 ** -2.32 **  -3.17 ** -3.18 ** 
            
ln size   -0.63 *** -0.63 ***  -0.58 *** -0.58 *** 
ln age   -0.06  -0.06   -0.08  -0.09  
risk   -1.23 *** -1.25 ***  -1.65 *** -1.67 *** 
mtb   -0.23 *** -0.21 ***  -0.17 ** -0.17 ** 
loss   0.48 ** 0.49 **  0.49 ** 0.49 ** 
lev   0.86  0.85   0.88  0.88  
exsale   0.39 ** 0.38 **  0.44 ** 0.44 ** 
seg   0.03  0.03   0.04  0.04  
restruct   0.17  0.18   0.19  0.19  
fortrans   0.14  0.15   0.23  0.23  
big4   -0.72 ** -0.70 **  -0.73 ** -0.74 ** 
afees   0.95 *** 0.95 ***  0.95 *** 0.96 *** 
audch   -0.51  -0.50   -0.60 * -0.59 * 
ceochair   0.01  0.01   -0.06  -0.06  
bdind   -1.22 ** -1.24 **  -0.86  -0.85  
consum   -0.16  -0.18   -0.12  -0.13  
manuf   -0.87 *** -0.88 ***  -1.02 *** -1.03 *** 
hitech   -0.60 *** -0.61 ***  -0.68 *** -0.69 *** 
health   -0.96 *** -0.96 ***  -0.89 *** -0.89 *** 
soxyr2    -1.09 *** -1.10 ***  -1.08 *** -1.09 *** 
soxyr3    -1.59 *** -1.63 ***  -1.64 *** -1.67 *** 
intercept   -8.52 *** -8.62 ***  -9.04 *** -9.10 *** 
            
Material weaknesses  302  302   267  267  
Total observations   3,654  3,654   3185  3185  
Wald chi2   306.43 *** 316.18 ***  262.75 *** 265.89 *** 
Pseudo R2   0.18  0.19   0.20  0.20  
p-values are based on two-tailed tests: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All significance levels are calculated using bootstrapped bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals based on 2,000 resamples (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Substantially similar results are 
obtained by adjusting standard errors for intrafirm correlation (Froot, 1989) since firms without weaknesses are included for multiple years. 
Dependent variable ICW = 1 if internal control weakness reported; else zero.  
ln size = Natural logarithm of assets at beginning of year in $millions. 
ln age = Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has CRSP data. 
soxyr2 = 1 if second year of SOX regime reporting (i.e. year-end from Nov. 15, 2005 to Nov. 14, 2006), 0 otherwise;  
soxyr3 = 1 if third year, 0 otherwise.    Other variables are described in Table 2A. 
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Table 4 
CEO/CFO Performance-based Compensation and Severity of Internal Control Weaknesses (H2) 
  CEO  CFO 
 Company-Level  Account-Specific  Company-Level  Account-Specific 
Variable (exp’d sign) (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
delta_options (-) -0.62**  -0.14   -2.76  -3.76**  
delta_vest (none)  -0.24  0.16   0.32  -4.69 
delta_unvest (-)  -2.33  -1.20   -11.65**  -2.73 
          
delta_equity (none) -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11  -20.61*** -21.34*** -3.44 -3.27 
delta_salary (none) -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.01  -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 
opt_exer_ratio (none) -0.61* -0.61 -0.09 -0.08  -0.36 -0.34 -0.15 -0.16 
delta_restr (-) -5.24 -4.87 -1.62 -1.46  -29.95** -27.83** -0.88 -0.37 
ltip_ratio (-) -2.46 -2.37 -2.37 -2.35  -5.37*** -5.33*** -2.48 -2.49 
          
ln size -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.57*** -0.56***  -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.55*** -0.55*** 
ln age 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.11  0.09 0.07 -0.17 -0.17 
risk -8.96*** -9.23*** -0.61** -0.62**  -10.25*** -10.71*** -0.91 -0.90 
mtb -0.17 -0.15 -0.26** -0.24***  -0.11 -0.09 -0.20** -0.20** 
loss 0.32 0.34 0.59*** 0.60**  0.38 0.40 0.57** 0.57** 
lev 0.49 0.47 0.91 0.91  0.35 0.39 0.98 0.98 
exsale 0.29 0.28 0.47** 0.46**  0.35 0.35 0.50** 0.50** 
seg 0.07* 0.07 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
restruct 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.19  0.21 0.22 0.15 0.14 
fortrans 0.44** 0.46* -0.09 -0.08  0.44* 0.47* 0.07 0.07 
big4 -0.81** -0.80 -0.68** -0.66*  -0.78 -0.77 -0.79** -0.80** 
afees 1.33*** 1.33*** 0.81*** 0.81***  1.26*** 1.27*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 
audch -1.86* -1.86*** -0.03 -0.02  -1.83*** -1.79*** -0.17 -0.17 
ceochair -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01  -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 
bdind -1.58 -1.57 -0.97 -1.00  -0.93 -0.93 -0.68 -0.69 
consum -0.52 -0.53 -0.06 -0.07  -0.38 -0.42 -0.05 -0.05 
manuf -0.74** -0.76** -0.95*** -0.96***  -0.80** -0.84** -1.16*** -1.15*** 
hitech -0.22 -0.23 -0.93*** -0.93***  -0.36 -0.40 -1.02*** -1.01*** 
health -0.68 -0.67 -1.07*** -1.07***  -0.69 -0.68 -0.98*** -0.98*** 
soxyr2  -0.22 -0.24 -1.66*** -1.67***  -0.18 -0.20 -1.69*** -1.69*** 
soxyr3  -0.56** -0.61** -2.49*** -2.53***  -0.59** -0.68** -2.56*** -2.56*** 
intercept -14.24*** -14.41*** -7.33*** -7.38***  -14.45*** -14.61*** -8.11*** -8.11*** 
          
Material weaknesses 109 109 193 193  98 98 169 169 
Total observations 3,461 3461 3543 3543  3016 3016 3087 3087 
Wald chi2 128.13*** 128.75*** 231.36*** 248.11***  111.85*** 114.37*** 210.21*** 211.68*** 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.21  0.18 0.18 0.23 0.23 
Dependent variables:  Company-Level = 1 if one or more Company-Level material weaknesses or three or more Account-Specific weaknesses, and 0 otherwise.  
 Account-Specific = 1 if a firm reports one or two Account-Specific material weaknesses, and 0 otherwise. 
 All methods and other variables are consistent with Table 3. 
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These results indicate that firms with higher long-term pay-for-performance are less likely to report ICWs. 
In contrast, short-term incentives such as vested options (salary, bonus and current exercise of options) are unrelated 
to the disclosure of an ICW. These findings provide support for H1 and suggest that time horizon is a critical factor 
in evaluating how compensation scheme incentives affect managers’ choices concerning the strength of systems of 
internal control. 
 
This may provide insight into the conflicting findings in prior research. Burns and Kedia (2006) find a 
positive relation between vested options (short-term incentives) and accounting restatements in the pre-SOX 1994-
2001 period while Armstrong et al. (2010) find no relation between the aggregate of vested options, unvested 
options, restricted equity and unrestricted equity (the sum of short- and long-term incentives), and restatements in 
the 2001-2005 period using similar methods, and a negative relation using propensity score matching. If short-term 
and long-term incentives have different effects, a change in their mix over time may explain different findings in the 
pre-SOX period. 
 
H2 Results: CEO/CFO Compensation Sensitivity and Severity of Control Weaknesses (H2) 
 
In Table 4, the analysis is refined by investigating whether the results found for H1 are driven by company-
level weaknesses due to their more severe nature, as hypothesized in H2. For the CEO sample the separation of 
weaknesses (see models (2) and (4)) into two smaller control-severity samples reduces the power of the analysis, 
eliminating significance of the disaggregated coefficients in model (2). The significant negative coefficient for 
aggregate option sensitivity in model (1) appears to arise from unvested options. The latter’s larger coefficient 
relative to model (3) (-2.33 vs. -1.20) suggests that compensation sensitivity may have a greater effect on company-
level weaknesses than account-specific weaknesses, consistent with H2. 
 
For the CFO sample, separation of weaknesses into models (6) and (8) allows a stronger pattern of relations 
between sensitivity and control weaknesses to become apparent. The significant relation between unvested option 
sensitivity and weaknesses seen in Table 3 model (4) is driven by company-level weaknesses: its coefficient in the 
company-level regression (-11.65) is four times that in the account-specific weaknesses regression (-2.73). The 
separation makes salient the impact of restricted equity holdings on company-level weaknesses (−27.83) relative to 
account-specific weaknesses (-0.37), and highlights company-level weaknesses as the driver of effects for 
unrestricted equity (-21.34 vs. -3.27 for account-specific weaknesses). Finally, the effect of long-term incentive plan 
payouts is significant for company-level weaknesses (-5.33) but not account-specific weaknesses (-2.49).  
 
These findings for CEOs and CFOs occur despite the loss in power arising from separation of the samples 
by severity of weaknesses. This evidence provides consistent though limited support for H2: long-term incentives 
are more strongly related to the likelihood of reporting company-level weaknesses than account-specific 
weaknesses. This relation is clearer with CFOs, who are primarily responsible for the processes generating financial 
information and the financial information reported by the firm. 
 
These findings supplement recent evidence of improvements in earnings quality in the post-SOX era. They 
indicate that the incentives provided to CEOs and CFOs by unvested options and long term incentive plans reduce 
the likelihood of reporting one or more ICWs in the SOX regime. CFOs holdings of unrestricted equity also reduce 
the likelihood of reporting company-level weaknesses. This greater scope of impact of compensation on CFOs may 
occur because, relative to other executives, CFO efforts in fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities are likely to be 
the most important determinant of financial reporting quality (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2009; Mian, 2001). Geiger 
and North (2006) find that discretionary accruals decrease significantly following the appointment of a new CFO, 
but not the concurrent appointment of a new CEO. Previous research also underscores the importance of CFO 
qualifications in improving internal controls and financial reporting quality (Aier et al., 2005; Li et al., 2010). The 
current findings suggest that incentives to avoid reporting control weaknesses outweigh those rewarding financial 
performance, motivating CFOs to perform their fiduciary responsibilities relating to financial reporting.  
 
Coefficients for the control variables are generally in the predicted directions and are similar to the 
inferences from the univariate analysis. In Tables 3 and 4, we find that firms reporting ICWs are more likely to be 
small, have lower market-to-book ratios, report more losses, leverage and extreme sales, and have more segments 
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and foreign transactions. They are less likely to be clients of Big 4 auditors, report higher audit fees and restate 
current or future earnings, but less likely to change auditors and less likely to have independent board members.
9
 
 
Endogeneity 
 
To investigate the possibility that current year compensation sensitivity is an outcome rather than a cause of 
current year internal control levels (i.e., that reporting of ICW leads to lower current year compensation sensitivity), 
for each sensitivity variable
10
 found significant in the results we identified the current-year component that might be 
adjusted in response to current-year reporting of ICW (i.e., the potentially endogenous portion of each). To evaluate 
whether internal control reporting is related to these potentially endogenous components the following two-step 
procedure was performed (analysis not tabulated). A first stage model was created of determinants of reporting 
ICWs using variables identified in prior research examining ICWs (Doyle et al., 2007a, 2007b) and audit 
governance (Klein, 2002), and used to calculate an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) of the likelihood of a firm reporting an 
ICW for each observation. The second stage adds the IMR for control weaknesses to regressions predicting the 
potentially endogenous components, one for each type of compensation sensitivity. Given the negative coefficients 
found in the Tables 3 and 4, a negative IMR coefficient would indicate that the likelihood of reporting an ICW is 
negatively related to that component, and therefore endogeneity may be driving the results found. However, the IMR 
coefficient was not significantly negative in any of the second stage models, indicating that reporting ICWs does not 
lead to a reduction in current-year compensation sensitivity, i.e., endogeneity is not driving the relations found. 
 
Further Analysis for Robustness of Results 
 
To assess the robustness of our results to alternative models, samples and methods for measuring our 
variables, the following analyses were performed (results not tabulated) 
 
Alternative Model – Change in Effects Over Time 
 
To investigate whether the results are sensitive to the time available for a firm to fix their internal control 
problems, a dummy variable was created for reports after the initial year. The variable was substituted for the soxyr2 
and soxyr3 dummy variables, and interaction terms of the variable with each of the compensation variables were 
added to equation (2). None of the interaction terms were significant for CEOs or CFOs. 
 
Alternative Samples  
 
The period of the analysis is limited to 2004 to 2006 because ExecuComp revised its reporting of long-term 
incentive payouts in 2007, making it infeasible to perform the reported analyses in 2007. However, analysis of other 
components of compensation (i.e. options and equity holdings) using the 2007 data provides support for the two 
hypotheses (p<0.05).  
 
The control weakness sample used in the analyses only includes firms reporting weaknesses under SOX 
Section 404. To test the generalizability of our results, we considered control weaknesses reported by non-
accelerated filers under Section 302
11
 for fiscal years ending before November 15, 2004, the effective date of 
Section 404. The results are consistent with, but weaker than, those reported (p<0.10).  
 
The control sample of firms not reporting weaknesses includes a firm for each year of the three-year sample 
period, thereby introducing serial correlation. The tests in Tables 3 and 4 correct for this correlation across 
observations using robust standard errors. As alternative test, potential serial correlation in variables across the three 
                                                 
9 Our results continue to hold when we control for firms that have restated earnings during the sample period. 
10 Unvested options are reduced as options vest during the year but this occurs under the terms of existing contracts, making it 
exogenous, i.e., not affected by the reporting of control weaknesses. Restricted equity grants that vest during the year are 
similarly exogenous. 
11 As noted in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2008) and Doyle et al., (2007b), Section 302’s rules are less clear, requiring less rigorous 
assessments of controls compared to Section 404. This may have led to the weaker current findings. 
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years in the control sample was removed by retaining only the first occurrence of a control firm in the analysis. This 
yielded similar results.  
 
The analysis reported in Tables 3 and 4 only consider the first year a firm reports ICW. The results are 
robust to inclusion of observations where firms reported weaknesses in subsequent years (CEO=406, CFO=360). 
 
Alternative Measures of Severity of ICW and Explanatory Variables 
 
The analysis was performed using the number of control weaknesses reported as the dependent variable. 
This variable takes on one of three values: 0, 1, and 2 for all instances where the number of weaknesses is greater 
than one. The results provide support for H1.  
 
Compensation Sensitivity and Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses  
 
Moody’s has stated that the existence of ongoing internal control problems can trigger negative rating 
action against the firm (Moody’s, 2006), emphasizing the need for the remediation of internal control deficiencies to 
restore confidence in the firm’s financial reporting. The timely remediation of ICWs also reflects the efficacy of the 
corporate governance mechanism (Goh, 2009; Johnstone et al., 2011). We conducted a preliminary analysis 
(untabulated) of the association between remediation and compensation incentives. For the CEO (CFO) sub-sample, 
140 (124) firms that reported ICW in 2004, 91 (80) firms remediated the weaknesses in 2005 and 33 (31) in 2006. 
For the 115 (99) firms reporting ICW in 2005, 98 (83) firms adopted prompt remediation measures in 2006. We 
compared firms that fully remediate control weaknesses immediately in the subsequent year to a control group that 
remediate within two years (the maximum within the sample period) or do not remediate. As an alternative, the 
control group was also narrowed to include only firms that did not remediate during the period. We found support 
for the impact of long-term CFO incentive compensation (i.e. equity holdings) on remediation. However, due to the 
relatively small sample size, the power of the test is likely to be low.  
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study examines how the level and time horizon of sensitivity for different types of performance-based 
CEO and CFO compensation affect the likelihood of reporting material weaknesses in internal control required by 
SOX. The study finds that long-term incentives, including unvested options, and long term incentive plans, are 
negatively associated with the reporting of ICWs. In contrast, there is evidence that vested CEO options are 
positively related to ICW reporting, while other short–term incentives are unrelated to ICW reporting, with the 
exception of unrestricted equity holdings for CFOs only. This exception may be an artifact of the small value of 
these holdings relative to other forms of compensation and holdings of the CEO, which render them long-term 
holdings for the purpose of market signalling. These relations hold after controlling for determinants of ICWs 
identified in prior research. The results provide evidence that time horizon is an important factor in understanding 
the impact of incentives. They also indicate that incentives to comply with SOX go beyond the financial and 
criminal penalties specified in the legislation to include CEO and CFO compensation arrangements within the firm.  
 
These effects vary with the severity of control weaknesses, with company-level weaknesses more strongly 
negatively related to compensation sensitivity than account-specific weaknesses. Unvested option sensitivity is 
associated with company-level but not account-specific weaknesses for both CEOs and CFOs. Restricted and 
unrestricted equity holdings and long term incentive plan payments are also related to company-level weaknesses 
but not account-specific weaknesses for CFOs. 
 
This study has several limitations. First, we use data from SOX 404 internal control reports by focusing on 
firm-years with both CEO and CFO compensation data from ExecuComp, which consists of fairly large firms. 
Using accelerated filers that disclose control weaknesses limits the generalizability of the results. In addition, CFOs 
are only included in the ExecuComp data, and this sample, if they are among the top five highest paid executives of 
the firm. To the extent that CFO pay reflects their importance within a firm, the results may not generalize regarding 
firms whose CFOs are not among the five highest paid executives. Third, the statistical power of the various tests 
performed may be low due to the small sample size. Fourth, it is possible that the results are an artifact of 
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unobserved factors that affect the relation between internal control quality and performance-based compensation. 
Finally, given that audit failures are possible for SOX internal control reporting, to the extent that managers are able 
to hide weaknesses from the auditors, our measure of internal control quality may not include all firms with ICWs. 
 
These findings have significant implications for boards of directors, managers, auditors, regulators and 
researchers. Managers' responses to SOX requirements are moving in the direction hoped for by regulators, but only 
long-term incentives are related to internal control quality. Individual firms' boards of directors and managers may 
want to consider whether long-term share value-based incentives and short-term negative incentives for SOX 
violations are sufficient to offset incentives to weaken controls in order to manipulate performance, and may also 
evaluate the penalties for company-level weaknesses relative to account-specific weaknesses. Auditors can use these 
findings to inform their assessment of control environment risk at their clients. Regulators may find these results 
useful in assessing the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and considering whether and how the level of internal 
control reporting should be changed in the future. For researchers, these findings provide the first evidence 
concerning how the time horizon of formal ex ante performance-based compensation incentives affects the quality 
of internal control in the SOX 404 era. The stronger effects of restricted and unrestricted equity holdings for CFOs 
relative to CEOs contributes to the ongoing debate on the relative importance of the compensation structure of these 
two key executives, and suggests that for two forms of compensation, CFO compensation is more salient in 
explaining internal control quality. The findings extend research indicating that control weaknesses of differing 
severity have different causes (Doyle et al., 2007a) to address the critical role of compensation structure.  
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